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Payment incentives are known to influence healthcare but little is known about the impact of
paying directly for achieved outcomes. In England, novel purchasing (commissioning) of
National Health Service (NHS) stop smoking services, which paid providers for quits
achieved whilst encouraging new market entrants, was implemented in eight localities (pri-
mary care trusts (PCTs)) in April 2010. This study examines the impact of the novel commis-
sioning on these services.
Methods
Accredited providers were paid standard tariffs for each smoker who was supported to quit
for four and 12 weeks. A cluster-controlled study design was used with the eight intervention
PCTs (representing 2,138,947 adult population) matched with a control group of all other
(n=64) PCTs with similar demographics which did not implement the novel commissioning
arrangements. The primary outcome measure was changes in quits at four weeks between
April 2009 and March 2013. A secondary outcome measure was the number of new market
entrants within the group of the largest two providers at PCT-level.
Results
The number of four-week quits per 1,000 adult population increased per year on average by
9.6% in the intervention PCTs compared to a decrease of 1.1% in the control PCTs (incident
rate ratio 1108, p<0001, 95% CI 1059 to 1160). Eighty-five providers held ‘any qualified
provider’ contracts for stop smoking services across the eight intervention PCTs in 2011/12,
and 84% of the four-week quits were accounted for by the largest two providers at PCT-
level. Three of these 10 providers were new market entrants. To the extent that the
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intervention incentivized providers to overstate quits in order to increase income, caution is
appropriate when considering the findings.
Conclusions
Novel commissioning to incentivize achievement of specific clinical outcomes and attract
new service providers can increase the effectiveness and supply of NHS stop
smoking services.
Introduction
Smoking is a leading cause of premature mortality and morbidity in developed countries [1].
In 1998, the UK government published a strategy to reduce smoking in England, which led to
the establishment of NHS smoking cessation support services [2]. Known as NHS stop smok-
ing services, they comprise a range of interventions dominated by one-to-one counselling
which provide smokers who want to quit with access to intensive behavioural support and pre-
scribed pharmacotherapy [2]. NHS stop smoking services are effective and highly cost-effective
[3–7]. However, their impact has been limited, with survey data indicating that only 6.2% of
smokers trying to quit had used these services [8], despite smoking cessation having a high pol-
icy profile [9–10]. NHS stop smoking services have been commissioned at local health econo-
my level, which until April 2013 were configured as 151 primary care trusts (PCTs) covering
England. Commissioners set local targets for four-week quit rates, defined as the percentage of
enrolled smokers reported to have quit at four weeks, which were subject to national monitor-
ing arrangements if they were outside the range 35% to 70% [3]. Commissioners typically of-
fered block contracts to providers meeting nationally defined criteria, which may use
subcontractors to deliver services [3,4,11,12]. This approach to commissioning led to variation
in the delivery of services and associated costs, and did not provide a strong incentive to maxi-
mise the number of quits achieved [2,12].
Payment incentives influence the behaviour of healthcare providers [13]. Policy makers in
England have followed developments in the United States and introduced payment incentives
relating to achievement of activity-based [14] and quality-based [15,16] measures. The UK
government is seeking to further promote effectiveness by directly linking payments to out-
comes, and literal ‘payment by results’ is being piloted for drug and alcohol misuse treatment
[5] and in the wider public sector [17,18]. The move to pay-for-outcomes has implications for
purchasers (commissioners), clinicians and provider organisations.
Stop smoking services intervention
In April 2010, commissioners from eight PCTs in one region volunteered to collaborate with
their host health authority (West Midlands Strategic Health Authority) and take a unified ap-
proach to piloting new contracts for stop smoking services. They adopted qualification-based
provider regulations known as ‘any qualified provider’ regulations, which allowed any provid-
ers to deliver services that met specified criteria, including adhering to NHS service quality re-
quirements and accepting new payment, contractual and reporting obligations [19,3]. This
approach was intended to encourage new providers to enter the market and stimulate innova-
tion. The commissioners also set outcome-based tariffs and the aim was to use the payment
system to incentivize the achievement of quits. Different tariffs were introduced for target pop-
ulations, such as those in routine and manual occupations and pregnant women. Payments
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were made for quits recorded at both four and 12 weeks, thereby incentivizing extended sup-
port for individuals attempting to stop smoking. A normative approach was taken by the com-
missioners to determining the tariffs shown in S1 Table [20]. In non-intervention PCTs, and
the intervention PCTs before April 2010, stop smoking services providers were typically
funded using block contracts, as described above [3,4,11,12]. The new tariffs were implemented
across the eight participating PCTs for three years from April 2010 and our study examined
progress made by the intervention over this period.
The objective of this study was to evaluate the impact of the stop smoking intervention and
this study is the first to report the impact of commissioning NHS treatment using payment in-
centives based solely on achieving specific clinical outcomes combined with opening the pro-
vider market using qualification-based regulations [19].
Methods
Study design
We used a cluster controlled study design in which the eight intervention PCTs were retrospec-
tively matched to a control group of the 64 PCTs with similar demographics which did not im-
plement the outcome-based payment system. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has
categorised geographic areas of the UK based on similar local population characteristics using
census data [21]. Each of the 151 PCTs in England have been assigned to one of 20 ONS sub-
groups, which are used by the Department of Health for comparing spend at programme level
[22]. The eight intervention PCTs fall into six ONS subgroups along with 64 other PCTs for
which the population characteristics are summarised in S1 Box. The adult population in 2012/
13, defined as individuals aged 20 years and over, totalled 2,155,577 across the eight interven-
tion PCTs and 17,582,642 across the 64 control PCTs. We used this ONS classification to deter-
mine the six clusters and associated control PCTs used in the analysis (Table 1). We used 2009/
10 as the baseline and assessed performance over the subsequent three years.
Main outcome measures
Our outcome measures are 1) The number of enrolled smokers per 1,000 adult population. 2)
The number of four-week quits per 1,000 adult population. A four-week quit is defined as a
treated smoker self-reporting continuous abstinence from smoking from day 14 post-quit date
whose quit status within 25 to 42 days of the quit date has been assessed (either face-to-face or
by telephone, text, email or postal questionnaire) [10,23]. Two datasets on four-week quits are
published; self-reported quits and self-reported quits verified by carbon monoxide (CO) test-
ing. Neither dataset is ideal for assessing changes in quit performance; changes in CO-verified
quits may reflect changes in CO verification activity rather than changes in the number of
smokers quitting, and some self-reported quits are found to be invalid following CO testing.
Table 1. Intervention PCTs, ONS subgroups, clusters and number of control PCTs
Intervention PCT Ofﬁce for National Statistics subgroup Cluster Number of PCTs in the control group
A, B Centres with Industry A 1 9
C Centres with Industry B 2 7
D Industrial Hinterlands A 3 14
E Manufacturing Towns A 4 13
F Prospering Smaller Towns B 5 12
G, H Prospering Smaller Towns C 6 9
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123349.t001
Smoking Cessation Intervention
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The most recently published national data for 2008/9 show that 15.3% (19,424/126,838) of self-
reported quits by men and 16.5% (23,131/139,995) of self-reports quits by women were found
to have a CO reading of more than 10ppm, and therefore were not deemed to be valid. In order
to adjust for the over reporting of quits not confirmed by CO testing, we have excluded these
gender specific proportions of quits not confirmed by CO testing. This assumption, which fa-
cilitates making use of both available published datasets on four-week quits, is investigated in
our sensitivity analysis. 3) The number of four-week quits verified by CO testing as a percent-
age of enrolled smokers (the four-week quit rate used by the Department of Health to monitor
performance). 4) The number of stop smoking services providers holding ‘any qualified pro-
vider’ contracts in 2011/12. 5) The percentage of four-week quits accounted for by the largest
two providers at PCT-level in 2011/12, and whether they were existing or new market entrants.
6) The percentage of self-reported quits validated by CO testing over four years from April
2008 to March 2013.
Data sources
Our main analysis used published PCT-level data on stop smoking services for the years 2009/
10 to 2012/13 [24]. Data on the adult population were obtained from the ONS mid-year popu-
lation estimates [25,26]. The provider-level data on four-week quits for the intervention in
2011/12 were provided by NHSWest Midlands Healthcare Commissioning Services. These
data are not directly comparable to the PCT-level data used in the rest of the analysis because
of differences between definitions used for contractual and payment systems and those used
for national reporting. In addition, in some intervention PCTs, there were parallel commis-
sioning arrangements which supplemented the commissioned intervention scheme.
Statistical Analysis
We began with exploratory plots of the outcome variables over time for each PCT nested with-
in clusters. We used mixed effects Poisson regression models to account for “clustering” effects,
with repeated measures nested within PCTs and PCTs nested within clusters (n = 6). PCTs and
clusters (n = 6) had random intercept terms and PCTs had a random slope term. The response
variable was a given smoking cessation outcome measure (e.g. the estimated number of four-
week quits), with an exposure variable reflecting the area of opportunity (e.g. adult population).
The model had three covariates—pilot PCT (yes/no), years (continuous, 0 to 3) and their inter-
action. The hypothesis of interest (i.e. "effect-size") was represented by the interaction term
(rate of change of the incidence rate ratio). If the interaction term was significantly greater than
1 then we can conclude that the intervention PCTs have a higher rate of change than controls.
Statistical significance was set at 5%. Plots were produced in the lattice package [27] in R [28]
and modelling was undertaken in Stata 12 [29].
Sensitivity analysis
We have undertaken sensitivity analysis at an aggregate level to explore whether changing our
measure of quits or controls altered the findings. Our baseline analysis assumed that 16% of
quits not confirmed by CO testing should be excluded, and we varied this by plus or minus 8%,
(a) and (b) respectively, as well including all self-reported quits (c) and only CO-verified quits
(d). We made three changes to the control. We reran the analysis taking account of the pres-
ence of the pre-existing ‘spearhead’ localities (e). The spearhead group was announced by the
Department of Health in 2004, and comprised the 20% of local authorities in England facing
the greatest health challenges [30]. The aim was to reduce health inequalities by targeting a
range of interventions including smoking cessation services. Four of the intervention PCTs
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were in the spearhead group, and we compared these to those controls which were also spear-
head PCTs. Similarly, we compared the four non-spearhead PCTs to only those control PCTs
which were also non-spearhead PCTs. This reduced the total number of control PCTs from 64
to 48. We changed the control group in order to focus on non-intervention PCTs with the
most similar performance to the intervention PCTs in terms of four-week quits per 1,000 adult
population in the baseline year (2009/10). We included the two non-intervention PCTs with
the most similar level of performance to each of the eight intervention PCTs (f). Using this cri-
terion for selecting control PCTs, intervention PCTs D and E shared one control PCT and so
the next closest performing non-intervention PCT was selected as a control PCT for PCT E.




The intervention PCTs experienced an increase in the number of enrolled smokers per 1,000
adult population of 5.5% per year on average compared to a decrease of 2.5% per year in the
control PCTs (Table 2; 5.5% = ((0.9751.082)-1)100). This difference, expressed as a ratio of
rates (i.e. the interaction term) was statistically significant (1.082 = 1.055/0.975, p<0.001, 95%
CI 1.040 to 1.127) (Table 2). The intervention PCTs’ baseline enrolment per 1,000 adult popu-
lation was not significantly lower than that of the controls (0.955, p = 0.633, 95% CI 0.792 to
1.152) (Table 2). Cluster-level results are shown in S2 Table and the clusters exhibit a range of
experience relating to enrolment over the four years (Fig 1). For example, the number of en-
rolled smokers per 1000 adult population for the intervention PCTs G and H and their nine
control PCTs in cluster 6 (prospering smaller towns C) are comparatively similar and low in
contrast to intervention PCT E and its 14 control PCTs in cluster 3 (industrial hinterlands A)
(Fig 1 and S2 Table). In two of the intervention PCTs (D and H) progress with implementing
the intervention was limited and some of the stop smoking services activity remained under
pre-existing contractual arrangements.
Four-week quits
The number of quits per 1,000 adult population increased by 9.6% per year on average in the
intervention PCTs, compared with a decrease of 1.1% per year in the control PCTs, and the dif-
ference in the ratio of rates was statistically significant (incident rate ratio 1.108, p<0.001, 95%
CI 1.059 to 1.160) (Table 2 and S3 Table).
The approximately tenfold better rate of improvement in performance of the intervention
PCTs compared to the control PCTs was maintained when we varied the percentage of exclud-
ed quits not confirmed by CO testing by plus or minus 8%, as well including all self-reported
quits and only CO-verified quits (S4 Table). The finding was similarly not affected by changing
the control group to account for ‘spearhead’ localities or baseline quit performance, or compar-
ison with all non-intervention PCTs in England (S4 Table). Data on quit numbers are shown
in S5 Table.
The four-week quit rate used by the Department of Health to monitor performance, defined
as the number of CO-validated four-week quits as a percentage of the number of enrolled
smokers, increased by 6.8% per year on average in the intervention PCTs and 2.8% per year in
the control PCTs, and the difference in change was not statistically significant (incident rate
ratio 1.039, p = 0.204, 95% CI 0.979 to 1.102) (Table 2, S6 Table and Fig 2). By 2012/13, the
CO-validated four-week quit rate was 42.8% in the intervention PCTs compared to 35.7% in
Smoking Cessation Intervention
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the controls. The difference in change was similar when including all self-reported quits
(S4 Table).
Stop smoking service providers
In 2011/12, 85 providers held stop smoking services contracts in the intervention PCTs under
the ‘any qualified provider’ regulations (Table 3). Six of these providers were existing NHS
community services providers. The other providers were either existing providers of stop
smoking services which had held subcontracts with the community services providers, or new
entrants to the market. They included general practitioners, hospital-based clinician teams,
and commercial and third-sector organisations.
The intervention’s data on ‘any qualified provider’ contracts show that six providers were
the largest PCT-level providers across the intervention, and they accounted for 75% of the total
intervention quits in 2011/12 (Table 3). In five of the PCTs, these largest providers were four of
the existing NHS community services providers. The largest provider in PCT D was also an ex-
isting provider. The largest provider in the other two PCTs [C,H] was a new entrant to the
Table 2. intervention and control PCTs, changes between 2009/10 and 2012/13: model findings
incidence rate ratio P 95% conﬁdence interval
change in the number of individuals enrolled per 1,000 adult population
intervention 0.955 0.633 0.792 to 1.152
year 0.975 <0.001 0.962 to 0.988
intervention.year 1.082 <0.001 1.040 to 1.127
constant 0.022 <0.001 0.019 to 0.027
change in the number of 4-week quits per 1,000 adult population
intervention 0.869 0.061 0.751 to 1.007
year 0.989 0.161 0.974 to 1.004
intervention.year 1.108 <0.001 1.059 to 1.160
constant 0.010 <0.001 0.009 to 0.012
change in the number of CO-validated 4-week quits as a % of enrolled smokers
intervention 1.060 0.661 0.816 to 1.377
year 1.028 0.006 1.008 to 1.049
intervention.year 1.039 0.204 0.979 to 1.102
constant 0.325 <0.001 0.292 to 0.361
change in the number of CO-validated 4-week quits as a percentage of all self-reported quits
intervention 1.180 0.145 0.945 to 1.473
year 1.013 0.102 0.997 to 1.029
intervention.year 1.016 0.504 0.969 to 1.065
constant 0.673 <0.001 0.625 to 0.725
change in the number of smokers enrolled in stop smoking services not lost to follow-up per 1,000 adult population
intervention 0.850 0.147 0.683 to 1.059
year 0.980 0.034 0.962 to 0.998
intervention.year 1.049 0.089 0.993 to 1.108
constant 0.017 <0.001 0.015 to 0.020
change in the number of 4-week quits per enrolled smokers not lost to follow-up
intervention 1.016 0.800 0.896 to 1.153
year 1.009 0.099 0.998 to 1.020
intervention.year 1.055 0.001 1.022 to 1.090
constant 0.610 <0.001 0.585 to 0.636
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123349.t002
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market. This provider was also the second-largest provider in four of the other intervention
PCTs [A, B, E, G], and was the second-largest provider across all eight PCTs. Two of the other
second-largest providers were new entrants (PCTs C and F) and the other two were existing
providers (PCTs D and H), and these four providers accounted for 9% of the total intervention
quits in 2011/12 (Table 3). The three PCTs with the largest number of providers were those in
which the main provider accounted for a minority of quits [C, D, H].
Carbon monoxide validation
Ameasure of the quality of smoking cessation services is the percentage of self-reported quits
validated by CO testing, which increased by 3.0% per year on average in the intervention PCTs
compared to 1.3% per year in the control PCTs. Although this difference was not statistically
significant (incident rate ratio 1.016, p = 0.504, 95% CI 0.969 to 1.065) (Table 2 and S7 Table),
the intervention PCTs had comparatively high validation levels throughout the period com-
pared to controls in four of the clusters (S1 Fig). By 2012/13, 85.5% of self-reported quits were
validated in the intervention PCTs compared to 69.7% in the controls. Data on CO-validated
quits are shown in S5 Table.
Fig 1. 4-week quits per 1,000 adult population for intervention and control PCTs by cluster: 2009/10 to
2012/13 The figure shows the change in quits over time for the intervention PCTs compared to their
comparators in each of the six clusters. The clusters use the Office for National Statistics (ONS) subgroup
categories for geographic areas of the UK based on similar local population characteristics. The eight
intervention PCTs fall into six ONS subgroups along with 64 other PCTs which form the controls. Intervention
PCTs are shown in black and control PCTs are shown in grey. 2009/10 = 0 and 2012/13 = 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123349.g001
Smoking Cessation Intervention
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Fig 2. Enrolled smokers per 1,000 adult population for intervention and control PCTs by cluster: 2009/
10 to 2012/13 The figure shows the change in this measure of quits over time for the intervention PCTs
compared to their comparators in each of the six clusters. The clusters use the Office for National Statistics
(ONS) subgroup categories for geographic areas of the UK based on similar local population characteristics.
The eight intervention PCTs fall into six ONS subgroups along with 64 other PCTs which form the controls.
Intervention PCTs are shown in black and control PCTs are shown in grey. 2009/10 = 0 and 2012/13 = 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123349.g002





self-reported 4-week quits in 2011/12a
number % by largest intervention
provider
% by second- largest
intervention provider
% by all other intervention
providers
A 10 1936 67 19 14
B 13 2874 73 14 14
C 22 2179 37 27 35
D 27 2869 42 16 42
E 6 1420 88 8 4
F 6 1865 90 6 4
G 19 3138 79 6 14
H 26 917 48 6 46
total 85 17198 75 9 16
a Intervention data on ‘any qualiﬁed provider’ contracts
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123349.t003
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Intervention impact
As noted above, providers in the intervention PCTs increased reach to smokers by getting
more individuals to set a quit date. However, they did not maintain contact with the larger
group of individuals attempting to quit. The difference in change in the number of individuals
not lost to follow-up per 1,000 adult population for intervention PCTs and control PCTs (2.8%
and -2.0% per year, respectively) was not statistically significant (Table 2, S8 Table and S2 Fig).
Instead, the providers appear to have worked with similar numbers of individuals over the four
weeks following the setting of quit dates (defined as those not lost to follow-up), and achieved
more quits at four weeks from this group; the difference in the increases of 6.5% per year on
average for the intervention PCTs compared to 0.9% per year for the control PCTs was statisti-
cally significant (Table 2, S9 Table and S3 Fig). Whether intervention providers have, for exam-
ple, implemented screening of individuals who have set quit dates, in order to better target
their support to smokers thought likely to quit, is not known.
Discussion
Findings
The intervention PCTs that adopted novel commissioning policies, comprising pay-for-
outcomes and opening the market to new providers, experienced substantial increases in quits
compared to the controls: the number of four-week quits per 1,000 adult population increased
by 9.6% per year on average in the intervention PCTs, compared with a decrease of 1.1% per
year in the control PCTs. This finding is important because despite the growth in stop smoking
services, which are viewed as cost-effective, the scale of these services remains small in the face
of the challenge to reduce smoking prevalence [2]. The largest 10 providers in the intervention
accounted for 84% of the four-week quits in 2011/12, and three of these providers were new
market entrants. Although provision was dominated by existing NHS community services pro-
viders, the finding that a new entrant generated most quits in two of the eight intervention
PCTs suggests that provider diversity has been promoted. Whilst intervention and control
PCTs experienced increases in CO-validation rates over time, the intervention PCTs achieved
comparatively better performance than the controls.
The wider adoption of the novel commissioning policies described in our study is being pur-
sued in the NHS and other public sectors [17,18], despite very limited existing evidence on this
type of incentive. A recent Cochrane review [31] assessed the effect of financial incentives on
the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians. Only one of the seven studies
included in the review was of a payment per patient achieving an outcome, which was offered
as part of a multifaceted RCT to selected general practitioners in Germany for patients who
had quit smoking [32]. The general practitioners were given training on promoting smoking
cessation as part of their regular patient contacts, and this intervention was not found in isola-
tion to reduce quits [32,33]. Other systematic reviews of pay-for-performance in healthcare set-
tings similarly include a myriad of payment incentives across diverse services and contexts,
and the evidence on effectiveness [16,34–37], and cost-effectiveness [36–38] is limited and
mixed. These reviews include only one instance of pay-for-outcomes: an uncontrolled before-
and-after pilot study of English general practitioners reported that a payment for patients who
had stopped smoking was viewed as too low to warrant checking whether patients had stopped
smoking [36,39,40]. Incentivizing behaviour by funding service provision entirely on the basis
of outcomes achieved, rather than via a bonus supplementing a base payment, has been subject
to very limited testing despite its high policy profile [17,18]. As far as we are aware, our study is
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the first to report the impact of commissioning NHS treatment funded solely on achieving spe-
cific clinical outcomes combined with using qualification-based provider regulations.
Strengths and limitations of the study
Our cluster controlled study provides an appropriate quasi-experimental design for this type of
policy intervention [41]. Our approach to selecting controls on the criterion of sharing local
population characteristics, as defined by the ONS subgroup clusters, attempted to account for
the different PCT-specific contexts in which the intervention took place (illustrated in the
plots; Figs 1 and 3). For example, PCTs G and H were the least successful of the intervention
PCTs in terms of increasing the number of enrolled smokers per 1000 adult population, but it
is apparent from the experience of their nine control PCTs in cluster 6 (prospering smaller
towns C) that PCT G maintained comparatively high enrolment numbers (Fig 1). However,
the strong performance of the intervention PCTs was also evident when matching the interven-
tion PCTs to the 16 non-intervention PCTs in England with the most similar baseline perfor-
mance in terms of four-week quits per 1,000 adult population or comparing the intervention
PCTs to all other PCTs in England (S4 Table f-g).
Fig 3. CO-validated 4-week quits as a percentage of the enrolled smokers for intervention and control
PCTs by cluster: 2009/10 to 2012/13 The figure shows the change in enrolment over time for the
intervention PCTs compared to their comparators in each of the six clusters. The clusters use the Office for
National Statistics (ONS) subgroup categories for geographic areas of the UK based on similar local
population characteristics. The eight intervention PCTs fall into six ONS subgroups along with 64 other PCTs
which form the controls. Intervention PCTs are shown in black and control PCTs are shown in grey. 2009/
10 = 0 and 2012/13 = 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123349.g003
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By adjusting the recorded quit data for the over-reporting of non-validated quits, we have
attempted to improve the basis for making comparisons over time and between localities. As
noted above, we did not use CO-validated quits only in our main analysis because changes in
this measure may reflect changes in CO-verification activity rather than changes in the number
of smokers quitting. Furthermore, although CO verification is viewed as an important quality
indicator, and a comparatively high proportion of four-week quits in the intervention PCTs
were validated by CO testing (86% in 2012/13), the test does not provide assurance that absti-
nence has occurred beyond a few hours, and certainly not since two weeks of the quit dates. To
the extent that the intervention introduced a new incentive for providers to overstate four-
week quits achieved in order to increase income, caution is appropriate when considering the
findings. However, this incentive may have been moderated through the introduction of ran-
dom audits of cases carried out by commissioners in the intervention PCTs, and this activity
suggests that the outcome of the intervention should not be attributed to gaming or changes in
record-keeping. The requirement to monitor data supplied by providers paid for successful
quit data was recognised as being “especially important” in national guidance [3]. In addition,
if providers systematically lied about self-reported quit status, it might be expected that CO-
validation rates would have been comparatively low in the intervention PCTs. Furthermore,
prior to the intervention, and in the control PCTs, where there tended to be a single or coordi-
nating provider, a similar incentive to overstate four-week quits could have been driven by the
obligation to hit locally agreed targets for four-week quit rates [42]. Nationally, PCTs were ex-
pected to achieve year-on-year increases in the number of four-week quits, and PCTs’ perfor-
mance was subject to mandatory quarterly data reporting requirements and performance
monitoring of four-week quit rates by strategic health authorities [42]. Overall, performance of
stop smoking services had a high national profile, and all PCTs would have had good reason to
fully report all quits [3,2]. However, the quit rate measure could potentially have be manipulat-
ed through the reporting of the data on the number of smokers enrolled in stop smoking ser-
vices. A potential weakness of the data we have used on the number of smokers enrolled is that
providers may have faced different incentives for recording these data. Providers operating in
the intervention PCTs were required to record enrolment as smokers started to access stop
smoking services. Before the intervention began, and in other localities, providers may have
had little incentive to record enrolment until after the outcome was known at four weeks. This
may have contributed to the larger increase in enrolment and loss to follow up experienced by
the intervention PCTs.
Another measure of the reported impact of stop smoking services is the number of CO-vali-
dated four-week quits beyond those estimated to have occurred with only a prescription for
smoking cessation medication and no behavioural support [2]. For the reasons noted above,
we do not advocate using measures of performance which rely on CO-validated quits only and
the number of enrolled smokers, but we report this measure of impact for the intervention in
the supplementary information (S1 Text and S10 Table).
The intervention PCTs introduced enhanced payments for providers achieving quits in a
range of target subpopulations, the assessment of which is constrained by limited relevant pub-
lished data. Nevertheless, further analysis should explore whether the intervention was associ-
ated with ‘cream-skimming’ by providers seeking to avoid treating patients with more complex
needs [19]. The intervention introduced an incentive to achieve quits at 12 weeks, and to the
extent that control PCTs would not have shared this incentive, our analysis of performance at
four weeks may understate the impact of the intervention.
Intervention PCT C in cluster 2 had a comparatively low baseline enrolment rate, and it
could be argued that this made it comparatively easy to improve its performance. This may be
so, but the majority of intervention PCTs were not in this situation, and it is also apparent that
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enrolment across the intervention PCTs and controls was typically very low in relation to the
20% of the adult population who smoke [43]. It is possible that some of our control PCTs also
implemented locally agreed outcome-based payment systems, which could have resulted in our
study underestimating the impact of the intervention. However, we checked the published ten-
ders for stop smoking services which should be associated with such a change, and found no re-
cord of outcome-based payment systems being introduced in our controls [44]. We have not
undertaken a cost-effectiveness analysis of the intervention because of the lack of comparable
data. Nevertheless, based on the intervention’s tariff prices, and estimates on relapse rates to
12 months and associated gains to health-related quality of life, it is clear that the services pro-
vided in the intervention can be viewed as highly cost-effective (see S2 Text).
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that the novel commissioning arrangements can improve the effectiveness
and supply of the NHS stop smoking services. As the international policy momentum in pay-
ment-for-outcomes builds, this large-scale example of its application has relevance for policy
makers and clinicians working in a range of healthcare settings and systems.
Future research
Several aspects of the intervention merit further study. 1) The changes in quits, enrolment and
follow-up suggest that practice has changed in the intervention PCTs, but the precise mecha-
nisms associated with the change in financial incentives, remain unclear. 2) We have focused on
aggregate results, and study of individual clusters may provide useful insight into implementa-
tion of the intervention in local contexts. 3) By introducing payment incentives to achieve
12-week quits, the intervention PCTs have started to explore the provision of longer term sup-
port for smokers beyond the four-week threshold used by the Department of Health. This is im-
portant because about three-quarters of smokers who have quit at four weeks will relapse within
one year [45]. However, the impact on the relapse rate for those who have abstained from smok-
ing at 12 weeks is not clear, although studies show that the majority of smokers attempting to
stop smoking without treatment relapse within eight days of their quit date [46]. Given the objec-
tive to achieve long-term quits, the intervention PCTs’ experience warrants further evaluation.
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